Are coups back in Africa?, By Toyin Falola

The most recent military intervention of January 24 in Burkina Faso, combined with the other recent coups in Niger, Mali, and Guinea, have sparked a debate on whether or not coups have finally resurfaced in many parts of the continent, as well as the suspicion of how the nationals of these countries embraced these coups. The military took over power in Burkina Faso after deposing the government of Roch Marc Christian Kaboré in a coup d’état led by Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba.

Africa remains the continent with the highest number of coups d’état, at least in the history of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Coups or military interventions are always embarked upon with self-righteous reasoning by juntas aimed at salvaging nations. Without retelling the different escapades that have hit the continent in the past, it is not surprising that military rules have not been favourable to many concepts of civil society, and the violation of human rights is almost the first oppressive step taken by each of them, and Africa is still healing from the costly fiasco of military interventions.

To Africans, military coups d’état indicate that there are political challenges facing existing political structures and military forces have been taking over with the initial confessions of restoring normalcy to society. No matter how promising the pedagogical announcement of each coup is, its emergence has always proven to be evidence of political instability and economic brouhaha. For a long time until recently, the military had been in the barracks, but it seems their tamed lions have been unleashed upon the political atmosphere, with coups occurring at an alarming rate and in rapid succession across the continent.

The most recent military intervention of January 24 in Burkina Faso, combined with the other recent coups in Niger, Mali, and Guinea, have sparked a debate on whether or not coups have finally resurfaced in many parts of the continent, as well as the suspicion of how the nationals of these countries embraced these coups. The military took over power in Burkina Faso after deposing the government of Roch Marc Christian Kaboré in a coup d’état led by Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba. This came at the seeming peak of militant aggression in the country, and the military had come in to promise a return to peace, which the people, unfortunately, believe. Other coups, such as those in Mali, Chad, Guinea, and Ivory Coast, have rocked the African political atmosphere, drawing widespread attention. Also, Mali has been facing too many successive military interventions, with about three in twelve years. Other countries have had similar experiences, making this one of the points of consideration in asserting that something is wrong with the continent.

With the above recent events, it is clear that there is a propensity for military intervention, especially where an African country is facing political instability or a security challenge. This is because they have become the common excuse of juntas in Africa. Should we be surprised that the military is taking over the helm of affairs of some countries in undemocratic manners again? History repeats itself, but some scholars have pointed out factors that can be considered carefully in forecasting the resurgence of military interventions in Africa. One of these scholars is Robert Jackman,^[1]who, in contrast to Aristide Zolberg’s opposing beliefs,^[2] is optimistic that a series of events and factors could resurface in different areas and might be common to all of them.

After analysing different data in Africa, Jackman came up with a structural model, and he argues for a process that might have been noticed and could happen simultaneously or in different ways in a nation. First, he posits that if social mobilisation is not managed, it will result in the resurgence of coups, which could be typical in other countries. Jackman analysed two hypotheses for this factor and states that social mobilisation should not ordinarily cause political instability, as the number of participants may be small. However, if they become many due to the making of more people politically relevant in the society, the government must be able to quickly meet their demands, or else, as Deutsch stated, social mobilisation in the country will turn into a coup. Second, Jackman relies on the hypothesis of “organisational age,” as put forward by Huntington, that if the youth, like the African community, is the driving force behind mobilisation, it could most likely lead to a coup. This is because the youth are characterised by their desire for rapid change, which the government would most likely be unable to provide.

…some scholars have explained the reason for the resurgence of coups from the vantage point of the coup contagion hypothesis. This means that where there is a military intervention, there is a possibility that countries in other areas of the region might also resort to this. Military intervention in a country brings about a sense of legitimacy in another country and encouragement. Other countries, particularly those with similar problems, will start to see it as the only viable solution to their problems.

This first theory could be seen in many of the recent coups in Africa. For instance, before the Mali coup of 2020, there were a series of non-violent protests, one of which was led by the June 5 Movement – the Rally of Patriotic Force (M5-RFP), as is the case in other recent coups. Jackman’s second proposition is the effect of mass participation and a multiparty system. It is popularly debated that the increase in mass political participation and the existence of at least two political parties can cause political instability because the varying interests of these strata may not be realistically satisfied. The dominance of one or two parties allows for the aggregation of interests on collective fronts. Hence, the clash of different parties in a multiparty system might invite a coup. One example is the political instability in Lesotho, caused by the disagreements of the Basotho Congress Party (BCP) and Basotho National Party (BNP) over the king’s powers, which later led to the BNP’s alliance with the military.

Furthermore, Jackman analysed the view that cultural pluralism could cause political instability. He states that where there is more than one cultural origin, incoherent interests are likely, which could lead to clashes. More so, the origin of this stemmed from primordial loyalty to a certain group. However, on the contrary, there are beliefs that cultural pluralism would not be a problem, except there are dominant groups in the society. This view is backed by the history of ethnic disagreements in countries like Liberia, Burundi, D.R. Congo, Algeria, Madagascar, Congo, and Somalia. The 1967 Nigerian Civil War between the Biafrans (mostly Igbo) and the nation is an easy and relatable point of reference to further this assertion. Before the war, ethnic dominance had pre-informed the two 1966 military coups, which many interpreted as ethnically motivated.

In essence, different political mobilisations have been overtures to military interventions in Africa, just as they were in the past. Before the January 24 coup d’etat in Burkina Faso, different protests and mobilisations (violent or non-violent) had arisen. Similarly, the other two arms of the above model have been evident in the recent coups. Africa should have learnt from the past. These series of events are bound to reach their crescendo, which is expected to affect the community because many of people’s demands were not met. It is pertinent that other countries seeing the same symptoms should make immediate redress and rescue the situation because a coup can be contagious.

In line with the above, some scholars have explained the reason for the resurgence of coups from the vantage point of the coup contagion hypothesis. This means that where there is a military intervention, there is a possibility that countries in other areas of the region might also resort to this. Military intervention in a country brings about a sense of legitimacy in another country and encouragement. Other countries, particularly those with similar problems, will start to see it as the only viable solution to their problems. More so, the presence of the coup wave has been argued to be a catalyst for the resurgence of military interventions in other countries. The problem is that no one knows where the wave will start from. An example was the predominant waves of coups in French-speaking African countries and some British territories.

Democracy must be reformed, for its failures give birth to authoritarianism. To prevent further political intervention, governments must be responsible enough to provide solutions to their citizens’ requests and allow them to enjoy the dividends of democracy. The socialists who promised democracy became wealthy socialites, creating a mess, and becoming maggots that terminated their own lives in excessive consumption.

Fast forward to present-day Africa, there seems to also be the possibility of a contagion of coups in West Africa. Since 2010, there have been about sixteen military coups across the region and about forty-three in Africa. In a way, these events underscore the above assertion that a coup might be contagious and may explain whether or not military intervention is back in Africa. In the recent coups d’etat, it is ironic that the citizens have welcomed the military back with open arms. After the January 24 coup in Burkina Faso, about 1,000 citizens were seen celebrating, and there was no condemnation of the intervention. A similar development happened in Mali and some other African countries also. This development is quite disturbing, considering the notorious attributes that military juntas were known for in the past.

Such migration from the disposition to democracy to military rule only points to the failure of democracy in Africa. Democracy, which unarguably has been widely regarded as the best available system of government in which people and their interests are expected to matter, has failed on the continent. Economic crises, security challenges, and, most importantly, the dominance of corrupt practices in government have made citizens lose faith in the system. Africans are getting more frustrated by unfavourable policies, unnecessary red-tapism, and favouritism that have become attributes of African democratic government. After getting too tired of the disguise of democracy, there is a need for a paradigm shift and a revolution, in which the people now regard military intervention as an alternative solution. It should be clear that the people prefer democracy to military rule, which does not satisfy the immediate and important needs of the people. The victory achieved through military intervention can be regarded as pyrrhic because when the precarious tendencies of the military junta start manifesting, they may be more disastrous than what the people have previously suffered under a democratic government.

Democracy must be reformed, for its failures give birth to authoritarianism. To prevent further political intervention, governments must be responsible enough to provide solutions to their citizens’ requests and allow them to enjoy the dividends of democracy. The socialists who promised democracy became wealthy socialites, creating a mess, and becoming maggots that terminated their own lives in excessive consumption. Reforms and positive deliverables will allow citizens to regain interest in democracy and defend it.

Furthermore, there is a need to remodel African democracy to consider African diversity and cultural uniqueness. Considering the various interests of the society, every group will go a long way in amending the constitutions to reflect the attributes of all identity groups. It is high time that the continent took a bold step to confront corruption and promote good governance. Hungry people cannot eat democracy. If changes are not treated as urgent, the military in other countries may follow the example of what has been happening in their surrounding regions, succumb to the pressure of political instability and take tothe  unlawful ascension to power. When thousands of people take to the streets to rejoice, understand their feelings and joy.

^[1] Robert W. Jackman,  “The Predictability of Coups D’état: A Model with African Data,” The American Political Science Review 72, no. 4 (1978): 1262–75. https://doi.org/10.2307/1954538.

^[2] Aristide R. Zolberg,  “Military Intervention in the New States of Africa,” in The Military Interventions: Case Studies in Political Development, ed. Henry Bienen (New York: Russell Sage, 1968), 71-102.

Toyin Falola, a professor of History, University Distinguished Teaching Professor, and Jacob and Frances Sanger Mossiker Chair in the Humanities at The University of Texas at Austin, is the Bobapitan of Ibadanland.